## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANTHONY D. STEVENSON,

Plaintiff,

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Civil Action No. 1:10-CV-0607 (DEP)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

**OF COUNSEL: APPEARANCES**:

FOR PLAINTIFF:

MARGOLIUS LAW OFFICE PETER M. MARGOLIUS, ESQ. 7 Howard Street Catskill, NY 12414

FOR DEFENDANT:

HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York P.O. Box 7198 100 S. Clinton Street Syracuse, NY 13261-7198

SATHYA OUM, ESQ. Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

DAVID E. PEEBLES U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

## **DECISION AND ORDER**

Currently pending in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.¹ Oral argument was conducted in connection with those motions on February 1, 2012 during a telephone conference at which a court reporter was also present. At the close of argument I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in his appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, a transcript of which is attached and incorporated herein by

This matter has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18 (formerly, General Order No. 43) which was issued by the Hon. Ralph W. Smith, Jr., Chief United States Magistrate Judge, on January 28, 1998, and subsequently amended and reissued by Chief District Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., on September 12, 2003. Under that General Order an action such as this is considered procedurally, once issue has been joined, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

1) Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is

GRANTED.

2) The Commissioner's determination that plaintiff was not

disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under

the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED.

3) The clerk is directed to enter judgment, based upon this

determination, dismissing plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.

David E. Peebles

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated: February 13, 2012

Syracuse, NY

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ANTHONY D. STEVENSON,

10-CV-607 VS.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Transcript of DECISION held on February 1, 2012, at the James Hanley U.S. Courthouse, 100 South Clinton Street, Syracuse, New York, the HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES, Presiding.

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: PETER M. MARGOLIUS, ESQ. (Via Telephone) 7 Howard Street

Catskill, New York 12414

For Defendant: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

(Via Telephone) Office of Regional General Counsel

Region II

26 Federal Plaza - Room 3904 New York, New York 10278 BY: SATHYA OUM, ESQ.

1 (Via Telephone:)

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THE COURT: I've reviewed the briefs and I've considered the arguments of counsel. Let me, as a backdrop, briefly recount the history of this case.

An application was made on behalf of the claimant for childhood disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits on December 4, 2006, alleging an onset date of January 19, 1973, and, therefore, before the claimant reached the age of 22. His application was denied. A hearing was conducted on August 20, 2008, by the Administrative Law Judge Thomas Grabeel, resulting in a decision on September 17, 2008, denying the application for benefits. That determination was made final by the Social Security Appeals Council's decision on March 31, 2010, to deny review.

In his decision, as we've discussed, Judge Grabeel applied the well-known five-step test for determining disability, found that plaintiff, first, had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during any relevant period. He found that the plaintiff suffers from severe impairments, including the history of spina bifida, borderline intellectual functioning, obesity, and diminished vision; but found that none of those meet or equal, either singly or in combination, any of the listed presumptively disabling impairments.

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ALJ Grabeel then went to survey the evidence in the record and concluded by finding that, despite his conditions, plaintiff maintains the residual functional capacity -- or RFC -- to perform a full range of sedentary exertional activities, except that he has visual limitations in that he is precluded from performing work requiring depth perception of full field vision or perfect near and far visual acuity and also might have difficulty with learning and understanding and carrying out complex directions.

After noting that the plaintiff had no past relevant work at step four to be considered and recognizing the shifting of burdens at step five, ALJ Grabeel first surveyed the Medical-Vocational Guidelines for use as a framework which suggests that a finding of no disability and that was confirmed after he elicited testimony from a vocational expert through the use of hypotheticals.

I have applied the highly deferential standard of review that applies in this case. The plaintiff has raised three principal arguments. The first is that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. DiGiovanni expressed in his December 4th, 2007, assessment of the plaintiff's limitations as those of a treating physician, which should have been offered deference. I note, first, that, undeniably, the opinion of a treating physician regarding the nature and severity of an impairment is entitled to

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considerable deference, provided that it is supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence.

To determine the weight to be given to a treating source's opinion, the ALJ should have considered several factors, including, significantly, the length of the treatment; relationship and the frequency of examination; the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; the degree to which the medical source supported his opinion; the degree of consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; whether the opinion is given by a specialist; and other evidence which might be brought to the attention of the ALJ.

Now, Dr. DiGiovanni is clearly a specialist, an orthopedic specialist. However, as far as I can see, this was the first and only time that Dr. DiGiovanni had seen the plaintiff and both his notes, his objective findings, and the overwhelming findings of other treating sources, including Dr. Oke, fail to support and are inconsistent with Dr. DiGiovanni's limited findings. The CAT scan that was administered, while showing spondylosis, showed no evidence of stenosis or other evidence of herniation.

Dr. Oke's notes, including at Pages 240, 243, and 257 to 265 reflect a very different picture. He prescribed only Motrin, Aleve and Extra Strength Tylenol for the

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plaintiff; and I note that on February 15th, 2008, when he saw Dr. Oke, the plaintiff stated that he was feeling well.

That is at the Administrative Transcript 240.

Dr. DiGiovanni's findings are also inconsistent with an exam administered on January 22nd, 2007, by Dr. Puri, an exam which could prove and provide substantial evidence.

So I find that the rejection of Dr. DiGiovanni's opinions was properly explained and well-supported.

The second point raised by the plaintiff concerns rejection of headaches, migraine headaches, as providing further limitation on the plaintiff's RFC.

As I indicated previously, first of all, migraine headaches were not mentioned as a limiting disability on plaintiff's application. That is at AT 141. It was not mentioned at the hearing when the plaintiff was asked about his limitations. That is at AT 49. It is only referenced in the medical history portion of two of Dr. DiGiovanni's reports. And plaintiff specifically and expressly denied having headaches to Dr. Oke at AT 240, 242, 257, 260, 262, and 264.

And getting beyond that, even assuming for the sake of argument, that the plaintiff does have headaches and does suffer from ongoing migraine headaches, there's no indication in the record that it has provided any limitation on his ability to perform work functions. Plaintiff is able to

read; he plays board games; and no one has said that he is unable to perform work functions because of his migraine headaches.

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Next, the third, and final question, concerns plaintiff's ability to perform the two jobs identified by the vocational expert in his testimony. Of course the, as a backdrop, application of the grid or the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in this case suggest a finding of no disability and supports the vocational expert's opinions.

Obviously, the plaintiff does suffer from non-exertional limitations, which could potentially erode the job base on which the Medical-Vocational Guidelines are based; and the ALJ, therefore, quite properly, sought the testimony of a vocational expert.

It's obviously a proper means of fulfilling the agency's burden at step five and the use of hypothetical questions to develop the vocational expert's testimony is proper and permitted, provided, of course, that the hypothetical utilized comprehensively and precisely includes each physical and mental impairment of the claimant, except as construed by the ALJ.

In this case, I find that the hypotheticals that were posed are defensible and are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

I understand the argument that has been raised

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concerning the GED level associated with the two jobs in question; but I do not find that the GED 3 designation is inconsistent with the finding of the need for the plaintiff to be able to carry out only simple low-stress entry-level job with simple instructions. The issue is addressed by one of my colleagues in *Cross against Astrue*, which is a case cited by defendant, where Judge Bianchini addressed the distinction between SVP and GED.

And, in my view, the plaintiff is capable of performing the functions of the two jobs identified by the vocational expert. He, first of all, again, he did not list his mental condition as any -- as limiting his ability to work in his application. His father and he expressed surprise that he was even being tested in that regard. He has a high school degree and took mostly regular coursework. He has a full scale IQ of 81.

And, so, I find that there is no evidence suggesting that the plaintiff cannot meet the requirements of the two jobs identified by the vocational expert in this case.

In sum, I find that the Administrative Law Judge in this case applied proper legal principles and his decision in the case is supported by substantial evidence.

So I will issue an order granting defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings confirming the

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I, DIANE S. MARTENS, Registered Professional Reporter, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I attended the foregoing proceedings, took stenographic notes of the same, that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of same and the whole thereof.

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DIANE S. MARTENS, FCRR